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EDITORIAL
Hurricane Sandy: Lessons Learned, Again
David M. Abramson, PhD; Irwin Redlener, MD
Hurricane Sandy was a sobering reminder to those of uswho call New York home that it is a port city and sub-ject to the whims of wind and water. The storm itself
wasmassive: climatologically, a thousandmiles wide at its peak;
economically, an estimated excess of $50 billion in damages.
In theNewYorkmetropolitan area, 97 people died in the storm,
thousands were displaced from their homes, and 2 major hos-
pitals required perilous evacuations even as the hurricane-
force winds engulfed the metropolitan region.
Vivid scenes of “medical humanitarianism” played out in the
days and weeks after Hurricane Sandy devastated neighbor-
hoods in New York and New Jersey. On streets in Rockaway,
Queens, doctors in mobile medical units treated exacerba-
tions of asthma among teenagers who were suffering in cold,
dank, and powerless apartments without their rescue medica-
tions. The doctors occasionally climbed 15 flights of stairs to
make house calls. In a Bronx gymnasium, hospital nurses and
clinicians who had volunteered to staff a functional needs shel-
ter were confronted with more than a hundred medically frag-
ile patients from adult homeswho suddenly appeared at the shel-
ter without medical records or accompanying staff. In
Manhattan, on the night the hurricane made landfall, hun-
dreds of medical students, residents, and nurses were pressed
into service to carry hospital patients down darkened flights of
stairs as generators failed.
Medical heroism? Perhaps. Or a stark illustration of the pre-
paredness gaps that still exist. Each of these scenarios reflect a
failure of systems, somemore predictable than others. And each
of these scenarios represents practices driven as much by
goodwill or desperation as by science and evidence. At least in
theory, all of these situations could have been prevented with
the right planning.
Many of the issues that emerged during and after Hurricane
Sandy were not within the power of either medicine or public
health to fix. Some of the storm’s biggest impacts were a con-
sequence of energy failures at bothmacro andmicro levels. The
disruption of the region’s fuel distribution network resulted in
severe gas shortages, which affected medical and public health
workforces, among others, and disrupted the area’s supply chain
for nearly 2 weeks. Locally, the energy disruptions had direct
effects—at least 8 of the deaths attributed to Sandy in theNew
York areawere the result of carbonmonoxide poisoning inhouse-
holds using generators or stoves for heat, and the evacuation
of 200 patients from New York University Langone Medical
Center was the result of a fuel pump failure.
Another critical issue was the public’s response to risk com-
munications, particularly themandatory evacuation orders given
for residents along the coast where an extraordinary storm surge
was expected and, indeed, materialized. As in the case last year
in anticipation of Tropical Storm Irene, substantial numbers
of citizens defied the mandate and stayed. This suggests that
much work is needed to better understand why people should
or should not evacuate pre-emptively, and how to effectively
communicate to at-risk populations before and during a crisis.
However, for those of us in the fields of disaster medicine and
public health preparedness, the question is, were we ready? Dur-
ing the past decade considerable public investment has been
made in standardizing command and communication, assur-
ing appropriate and rapid supply chains, and training themedi-
cal and public health workforces to respond appropriately. And
yet, in the week after the storm, persistent reports of wide-
spread gaps in the provision of coordinated relief were re-
ceived from the Rockaways to Coney Island to Staten Island
and New Jersey. The question was not one of capacity and ca-
pability as much as it was of communication and coordina-
tion. Resources did not always make it the last mile to reach
those most in need.
Norwas this event entirely unexpected. Just as the fictional 2004
Hurricane Pam exercise in Louisiana foreshadowed the 2005
Hurricane Katrina, a 2011 hurricane evacuation study com-
missioned by the US Army Corps of Engineers and the New
YorkCityOffice of EmergencyManagementhadominous echoes
of what was to come. The authors noted that, “The region’s
unique and severe vulnerability to storm surge and winds as-
sociated with coastal storms cannot be overstated. The region
has been impacted historically bymajor hurricanes but one has
not hit in recent history with the levels of population and in-
frastructure that are now in place. Many residents and busi-
nesses while ‘street smart’ regarding every day urban issues, are
inexperienced in dealingwith the direct impacts of amajor storm
event.”1
Climate scientists have also predicted this storm surge for years.
One 2011 report from the Earth Institutemapped a coastal storm
event that mirrored Sandy’s footprint. The authors warned of
“structural damage and impaired operations of communica-
tions, energy, transportation, and water and waste infrastruc-
ture; reduction of water quality through saltwater intrusion into
aquifers; and inundation of low-lying areas and wetlands.”2 The
handwriting on the wall has been clear.
The recovery fromSandy’s devastationhas only just begun.And,
unfortunately, true recovery from large-scale disasters is invari-
ably a prolonged and complex challenge that is poorly under-
stood and difficult to accomplish, whether here in the United
States or elsewhere in the world. That said, some lessons should
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be derived from the experiencewith Sandy—lessons that should
have been learned from past disasters as well. Communication
is critical, at all levels and to all who are affected. Directing
people to websites or Twitter feeds is of little use if they have
no power to charge their cellphone. Coordination did occur,
but only in fits and starts; moreover, it often happened outside
the conventional channels. Efforts should be made to broaden
those coordination channels to includemore diverse and emer-
gent groups. Also, as the metropolitan area turns its attention
from response to recovery, and the press turns its attention away
completely, communities have an even greater need to con-
sider what sustainable redevelopment can look like, and to take
seriously an investment in preparedness and mitigation.
The disciplines of medicine and public health can learn les-
sons, again, from Sandy: to develop more integrated systems,
to practice and train together, and to build redundancy into
everything, whether electronicmedical records or generator fuel
pumps. Certainly, this storm will also serve as a test of several
recent frameworks, the Centers for Disease Control’s Public
Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s National Disaster
Recovery Framework. Both can be refined in light of actual
deployments.
Sandy has been a humbling experience for those of us who live
or work in New York City, to imagine that the country’s larg-
est city, so resourceful and resource-rich, could have met its
match so easily. Although the blow has been not so great that
it has exceeded the city’s grasp to recover. That remains to be
seen, but given the city’s resilience post-9/11, one can easily
imagine the city rebuilding back strongly. It did reveal, how-
ever, some of the same vulnerabilities that the world wit-
nessed in Hurricane Katrina. These include the organizational
vulnerabilities of agencies, organizations, and emergent groups
that still do not communicate well with one another, and the
social vulnerabilities that continue to place isolated and mar-
ginalized groups in harm’s way. Perhaps we will heed the les-
son next time.
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